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BIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
Anthrax Bioterrorism:  Lessons 
Learned and Future Directions
James M. Hughes* and Julie Louise Gerberding*
n September 11, 2001, the United States experienced the
worst terrorist attack in its history. As the nation sought
to deal with this tragedy, it would face a second wave of terror-
ism—this time, in the form of a biological attack. The suspi-
cion of anthrax in a patient by an astute infectious disease
clinician along with capable clinical and public health labora-
tory staff in Florida would lead to the discovery that Bacillus
anthracis spores had been intentionally distributed through the
postal system, causing 22 cases of anthrax, including 5 deaths,
and forever changing the realm of public health.
In this issue of Emerging Infectious Diseases, numerous
individuals involved in the public health aspect of the anthrax
investigation document their experiences. Articles describe the
epidemiologic and laboratory investigations, applied research
findings, environmental assessment and remediation experi-
ences, workplace safety issues, prophylaxis and clinical care
information, international aspects, and collaborations between
law enforcement and public health officials.  The articles also
highlight the widespread efforts made to identify the source of
exposure and prevent illness among those exposed. While
many of the individuals involved in this effort are acknowl-
edged in these articles, many others are not, including the large
numbers of medical, public health, law enforcement, and
emergency response personnel throughout the country and the
world who dealt with the numerous hoaxes perpetrated in the
weeks following the attack. We recognize and thank them for
their heroic efforts.
This issue also provides an opportunity to review the valu-
able lessons we have learned from these experiences. Fore-
most among them is the knowledge that we cannot afford to be
complacent. Throughout the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) as well as across other federal, state, and
local agencies, we remain alert for the first evidence of a dis-
ease outbreak. Multiple systems are now in place, both in the
United States and internationally, to detect initial cases. On the
local level, clinicians and laboratorians play a key role in this
process. Activities such as monitoring emergency room visits,
pharmacy requests, calls to emergency response and poison
control centers, and animal disease registries for unusual
occurrences are also expanding.  
These lessons have also led us at the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) to change the way we operate.
Changes have been made within our programs, among our
staff and partners, and in our coordination with other federal
agencies. Many of these changes have been based on valuable
input provided by public and private sector experts during
numerous consultations. Terrorism response capacity is being
integrated into existing infrastructures, further strengthening
the foundation of public health.
The anthrax cases highlighted the importance of the
“golden triangle” of response between clinicians and clinical
microbiologists, the health-care delivery system, and public
health officials. Steps have been taken to strengthen these and
other critical linkages, including those between professionals
in the human, veterinary, and public health communities and
between the public health, law enforcement, and emergency
response systems. 
DHHS has made available through CDC more than $918
million for state and local health departments to enhance their
terrorism preparedness programs. These funds are intended to
strengthen capacity to respond to bioterrorism, other infectious
disease emergencies, and other urgent public health threats.
Existing programs that proved invaluable during the events of
last fall, such as the Laboratory Response Network for Bioter-
rorism (LRN) and the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile
(NPS), both described in this issue in the article by Perkins et
al., have also been strengthened. During the anthrax attacks,
laboratories within the LRN tested more than 125,000 clinical
specimens and approximately 1 million environmental speci-
mens. The number of these specialty laboratories participating
in this network has now increased to more than 100, with at
least one in each state, enabling widespread testing for
microbes that might be used in a terrorist attack to cause ill-
nesses such as anthrax, tularemia, plague, and botulism. New
facilities have been opened, and improvements in others are in
progress or planned for the near future. The NPS has also been
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expanded to include additional medical supplies and person-
nel. State and local agencies are implementing measures to
ensure the successful transport and delivery of these critical
components of effective response.  
CDC has established rapid response teams composed of
individuals with expertise in field operations, epidemiology,
microbiology, data management, and communications. These
individuals have received training to enable immediate
deployment to affected areas to assist state and local efforts.
The Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS), CDC’s long-stand-
ing disease investigation training program for epidemiologists,
is also undergoing changes. In addition to traditional training
for rapid response to disease outbreaks, this year’s class of
officers, the largest in the program’s 51-year history, is receiv-
ing specialized field training to respond to terrorist attacks that
might involve the intentional release of toxic chemicals or
spread of infectious agents.
While the terrorist attacks experienced by the United
States have enabled us to better prepare for, recognize, and
respond to future attacks, more work needs to be done.  The
anthrax attack was relatively small and did not involve the use
of multiple agents, multiple modes of transmission, a drug-
resistant organism, transmission to animals, or global spread.
The surge capacity of the health-care delivery system was not
challenged. In addition, unlike some of the other threat agents,
the causative organism was easily isolated in clinical laborato-
ries; there was no risk of person-to-person transmission and no
risk of vector-borne transmission. 
Planning and practice are essential to ensure an effective
response to urgent public health threats. CDC has activated its
emergency operations center in response to the recent outbreak
of West Nile virus. During 2002, through mid-September,
West Nile virus has been identified in more than 40 states and
the District of Columbia and has caused more than 1,700
human cases, including more than 80 deaths. Although West
Nile virus is a naturally occurring disease, because of its recent
arrival in the United States many physicians are unfamiliar
with the signs and symptoms suggestive of infection. As part
of this response, we have provided professional education to
health-care workers, evaluated the quality of laboratory pro-
cessing of suspected samples, and streamlined communica-
tion—all critical components for responding to this outbreak
and for identifying ways to improve our capabilities for
addressing future emergencies.
Integral to planning is education. Health-care workers, par-
ticularly physicians and nurses, need training about the clinical
aspects of diseases that may result from the use of biological
agents. As has been evident in many recent investigations
(e.g., hantavirus pulmonary syndrome, West Nile virus menin-
gitis/encephalitis, anthrax), alert and knowledgeable clinicians
and laboratorians are vital to disease surveillance efforts and
recognition of new diseases and syndromes.  Education of the
public regarding the signs and symptoms of diseases associ-
ated with infectious agents is also essential.  CDC will con-
tinue to work with partners in clinical medicine and public
health to provide training for health-care providers and micro-
biologists and to seek innovative ways to disseminate informa-
tion to the public.
The efforts of this past year to improve terrorism response
capacities have been widespread, crossing multiple levels and
types of organizations and professions as well as international
borders. Within the public health system, we intend to con-
tinue these efforts, strengthening existing and establishing new
partnerships with diverse agencies, specialties, and disciplines.
While we believe that these efforts will enable us to respond
aggressively and effectively in the event of a future bioterrorist
attack, we acknowledge that inherent to terrorism is the
unknown. As was evident in the anthrax investigation, we
must learn as we go, adapting our responses as new informa-
tion becomes available and continuing to strive for excellence
in our science, service, systems, and strategies. Investments
made in the public health system to increase preparedness to
address the threat of bioterrorism will also pay dividends in
preparedness to confront the next influenza pandemic, other
emerging infectious diseases, and other threats to public
health.
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